12 KiB
phase, verified, status, score, re_verification, gaps, human_verification
| phase | verified | status | score | re_verification | gaps | human_verification | |||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06-signing-flow | 2026-03-21T00:00:00Z | passed | 9/9 must-haves verified | false |
|
Phase 06: Signing Flow Verification Report
Phase Goal: Client receives an email link, opens the prepared PDF in any browser, draws a signature, and the signed document is stored with a complete, legally defensible audit trail. Verified: 2026-03-21 Status: PASSED Re-verification: No — initial verification
Note: No .planning/phases/06-signing-flow/ directory or PLAN/SUMMARY files were present in the repo. Verification was performed directly against the codebase using the requirement IDs and phase goal supplied in the prompt.
Goal Achievement
Observable Truths
| # | Truth | Status | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Client receives a signing request email with a unique link | VERIFIED | sendSigningRequestEmail in signing-mailer.tsx sends via nodemailer with JWT link; called in send/route.ts after createSigningToken |
| 2 | Signing link opens the prepared PDF in any browser without login | VERIFIED | /sign/[token]/page.tsx is a public server component; /api/sign/[token]/pdf/route.ts serves file with JWT auth only, no session required |
| 3 | Client can draw a signature on the PDF | VERIFIED | SigningPageClient.tsx renders <SignatureModal> on field click; modal captures dataURL; field overlays positioned over react-pdf <Page> |
| 4 | Signed document is stored on disk with embedded signature | VERIFIED | embedSignatureInPdf in embed-signature.ts uses @cantoo/pdf-lib to draw PNG onto PDF pages, atomically renames to _signed.pdf; signedFilePath stored in DB |
| 5 | Token is single-use and cannot be replayed | VERIFIED | Atomic UPDATE … WHERE used_at IS NULL RETURNING jti in sign/[token]/route.ts POST; 0 rows = 409 Already Signed |
| 6 | SHA-256 hash of signed PDF is stored for legal integrity | VERIFIED | embedSignatureInPdf returns hex digest; stored as pdfHash in documents table; audit event pdf_hash_computed records hash + path |
| 7 | Complete audit trail is recorded for every signing event | VERIFIED | logAuditEvent persists email_sent, link_opened, document_viewed, signature_submitted, pdf_hash_computed to audit_events table with IP, user-agent, and timestamp |
| 8 | Agent is notified when a document is signed | VERIFIED | sendAgentNotificationEmail called fire-and-forget in POST handler after successful embed |
| 9 | Client can download a copy of the signed PDF after signing | VERIFIED | confirmed/page.tsx generates 15-min download JWT via createDownloadToken; /api/sign/[token]/download/route.ts validates token and streams signed file |
Score: 9/9 truths verified
Required Artifacts
| Artifact | Expected | Status | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
src/lib/signing/token.ts |
JWT create/verify for signing + download tokens | VERIFIED | createSigningToken (72h, DB-stored jti), verifySigningToken, createDownloadToken (15m, no DB), verifyDownloadToken with purpose check |
src/lib/signing/audit.ts |
Persist audit events to DB | VERIFIED | Inserts to auditEvents table with documentId, eventType, ipAddress, userAgent, metadata; timestamp is server-side defaultNow() |
src/lib/signing/embed-signature.ts |
Embed signature PNG into PDF, return SHA-256 hash | VERIFIED | Uses @cantoo/pdf-lib; atomic tmp-then-rename write; SHA-256 computed from disk after rename |
src/lib/signing/signing-mailer.tsx |
Send signing request and agent notification emails | VERIFIED | Two exported functions: sendSigningRequestEmail (react-email rendered) and sendAgentNotificationEmail (plain text) |
src/app/api/documents/[id]/send/route.ts |
Agent-triggered POST to send signing email | VERIFIED | Auth-guarded, creates token, sends email, logs email_sent audit event, updates status to Sent |
src/app/api/sign/[token]/route.ts |
Public GET (validate/audit) and POST (atomic sign) | VERIFIED | GET logs link_opened + document_viewed, returns doc data; POST atomically claims token, embeds PDF, logs audit chain, updates documents row |
src/app/api/sign/[token]/pdf/route.ts |
Serve prepared PDF bytes authenticated by JWT | VERIFIED | JWT-only auth (no session), path traversal guard, serves with Content-Disposition: inline |
src/app/api/sign/[token]/download/route.ts |
Serve signed PDF via short-lived download token | VERIFIED | Validates purpose: download claim, path traversal guard, streams as attachment |
src/app/sign/[token]/page.tsx |
Public signing page — server-side token validation | VERIFIED | Validates JWT and one-time-use before rendering any UI; error pages for expired/used/invalid |
src/app/sign/[token]/_components/SigningPageClient.tsx |
Client PDF viewer with field overlays and submission | VERIFIED | react-pdf renders pages; field overlays computed with coordinate flip (PDF bottom-left to screen top-left); POST to /api/sign/[token] with dataURLs |
src/app/sign/[token]/confirmed/page.tsx |
Confirmation page with download link | VERIFIED | Shows document name, signed timestamp, download button with 15-min JWT link |
src/lib/db/schema.ts (signingTokens) |
DB table for one-time-use token tracking | VERIFIED | jti PK, documentId FK, expiresAt, usedAt |
src/lib/db/schema.ts (auditEvents) |
DB table for full audit trail | VERIFIED | 6 event types enumerated, IP, user-agent, metadata (JSONB), server-side timestamp |
src/lib/db/schema.ts (documents columns) |
signedFilePath, pdfHash, signedAt, status |
VERIFIED | All four columns present; status enum includes Signed |
Key Link Verification
| From | To | Via | Status | Details |
|---|---|---|---|---|
send/route.ts |
createSigningToken |
import + call | WIRED | Token created, URL built, email sent in sequence |
send/route.ts |
sendSigningRequestEmail |
import + call | WIRED | Called with token URL and client email resolved from DB |
send/route.ts |
logAuditEvent('email_sent') |
import + call | WIRED | Logged after email send succeeds |
sign/[token]/route.ts POST |
embedSignatureInPdf |
import + await | WIRED | After atomic token claim; result (pdfHash) used in subsequent DB update |
sign/[token]/route.ts POST |
logAuditEvent (x3) |
import + calls | WIRED | signature_submitted, pdf_hash_computed with hash metadata |
sign/[token]/route.ts POST |
documents update |
drizzle .update() |
WIRED | status, signedAt, signedFilePath, pdfHash all set |
SigningPageClient.tsx |
/api/sign/${token} POST |
fetch in handleSubmit |
WIRED | Sends { signatures: [...] }, handles 200 and 409 |
SigningPageClient.tsx |
/api/sign/${token}/pdf |
react-pdf Document file= |
WIRED | PDF bytes fetched and rendered via react-pdf |
confirmed/page.tsx |
createDownloadToken |
import + await | WIRED | 15-min token generated and embedded in download URL |
download/route.ts |
verifyDownloadToken |
import + call | WIRED | Purpose claim validated; documentId extracted |
Requirements Coverage
| Requirement | Description | Status | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| SIGN-01 | Agent sends signing request email to client | SATISFIED | POST /api/documents/[id]/send creates JWT token and calls sendSigningRequestEmail |
| SIGN-02 | Client opens PDF in browser via email link | SATISFIED | /sign/[token]/page.tsx public server page; /api/sign/[token]/pdf serves bytes with JWT auth, no session |
| SIGN-03 | Client draws signature on document fields | SATISFIED | SigningPageClient.tsx renders <SignatureModal> on field click, captures canvas dataURL per field |
| SIGN-04 | Signed PDF is stored with embedded signature | SATISFIED | embedSignatureInPdf writes _signed.pdf; signedFilePath persisted to documents table |
| SIGN-05 | Token is single-use (replay prevention) | SATISFIED | Atomic UPDATE … WHERE used_at IS NULL returns 0 rows on replay; 409 returned without re-embedding |
| SIGN-06 | Client can download signed copy after signing | SATISFIED | confirmed/page.tsx + download/route.ts with 15-min scoped download token |
| LEGAL-01 | Audit trail: email sent, link opened, document viewed, signature submitted | SATISFIED | All four event types logged via logAuditEvent at correct points in send/route.ts and sign/[token]/route.ts |
| LEGAL-02 | SHA-256 hash of signed PDF stored | SATISFIED | embedSignatureInPdf returns SHA-256 hex; stored in documents.pdfHash; logged in pdf_hash_computed audit event with metadata |
| LEGAL-04 | IP address and user-agent captured in audit events | SATISFIED | x-forwarded-for / x-real-ip and user-agent headers extracted in both GET and POST handlers of sign/[token]/route.ts and passed to every logAuditEvent call |
All 9 requirement IDs: SATISFIED.
Note: LEGAL-03 was not listed in the phase requirement IDs supplied. If it exists in REQUIREMENTS.md it is not claimed by this phase and should be checked against another phase.
Anti-Patterns Found
| File | Line | Pattern | Severity | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
src/app/api/sign/[token]/route.ts |
229-246 | Agent notification email uses a second db.query to re-fetch document name, but passes freshDoc?.name for clientName (which is the document name, not client name) |
Warning | Agent email body says "Client: {document name}" — cosmetic bug, not a legal or security issue |
No blockers found. No TODO/FIXME/placeholder patterns. No empty return stubs. All handlers return real data from DB queries.
Human Verification Required
1. Signature Canvas Rendering
Test: Open /sign/[token] in a browser with a valid token and click a signature field.
Expected: Signature modal opens with a drawable canvas; drawing captures correctly and preview shows on the field overlay after confirmation.
Why human: Canvas API and signature_pad behavior cannot be statically verified.
2. PDF Renders Inline Without Login Test: Copy the signing URL from a sent email and open it in an incognito/private browser window. Expected: The prepared PDF renders page-by-page via react-pdf without any authentication prompt. Why human: Public route behavior with JWT-only auth requires a live browser test.
3. Signature Appears at Correct Position in Downloaded PDF
Test: Complete a signing flow and download the signed copy.
Expected: Signature image appears at the exact location where the agent placed the field during the prepare step, not offset or clipped.
Why human: The coordinate transform (PDF bottom-left to screen top-left, applied in getFieldOverlayStyle and then inverted in embedSignatureInPdf) requires visual confirmation.
Gaps Summary
No gaps. All 9 observable truths are verified as substantive, wired implementations. The signing flow is fully connected from email dispatch through token validation, PDF rendering, signature capture, atomic one-time-use enforcement, PDF embedding, SHA-256 hashing, audit trail persistence, and client download.
One cosmetic warning: the agent notification email passes document name as the clientName parameter (line 237 of sign/[token]/route.ts). This produces a misleading subject or body but does not affect correctness of the signing flow or legal defensibility of the audit trail.
Verified: 2026-03-21 Verifier: Claude (gsd-verifier)